sketches a profile of basic characteristics of young adults 18 to 34 in the U.S., of whom there were 67 million in 2006. "Non-Hispanic whites" and "blacks" are overwhelmingly long-term natives (nearly 90%), whereas 95% of "Asian" and 80% of "Hispanic" nationalities are of foreign birth or parentage. The newcomers in turn are situated at the polar ends of the opportunity structure. Educational and related inequalities between whites and blacks seem narrow compared to the gulf that separates Asians (at the top of the educational hierarchy, with more than 60% having college or advanced degrees) from Hispanics (at the bottom, with 40% of young adult males having less than a high school diploma). The latter, however, are half as likely as young black men to be jobless, and much less likely to be incarcerated. In these widely varying contexts of social inequality, the way young newcomers come to define themselves is significant, revealing much about their social attachments (and detachments) as well as how and where they perceive themselves to "fit" in the society of which they are its newest members. Selfidentities and ethnic loyalties can often influence long-term patterns of behavior and outlook as well as intergroup relations, with potential long-term political implications. And the decisive turning point for change in ethnic and national self-identities can be expected to take place in the second, not in the first generation. Several million others marched in cities across the country. It was one of the most extraordinary mobilizations in U.S. history-and the largest protest marches for any reason in most of those cities-surprising even the organizers. Just as surprising, perhaps most of the marchers were immigrants and their children-and for many, this was their first act of political protest.
Rewind to October 15, 1994, again in downtown Los Angeles: on that day more than 70,000 people marched to protest Proposition 187, a ballot measure which exacerbated ethnic tensions in California. It aimed to "Save Our State" by denying social and health services and access to public schools to undocumented immigrants and their children; and it required school districts to verify the legal status of students' parents and report any persons suspected of being in the U.S. unlawfully so that they may be detained and deported. The protest march that day was the largest in memory, heavily covered on television and by the news media-spawning subsequent marches and student walkouts in local campuses. To the marchers, who included many second-generation youths from area high schools, Prop 187 was an affront to their parents, friends and neighbors. Parents too joined in some of the marches or encouraged their children's participation, making the initiative an issue through which the budding teenage activists could bridge the generational divide and express themselves in solidarity with their parents.
One was a Southern California native and high school senior, Stephanie Bernal, half Latin and half Anglo (she self-identified as a "mixed chocolate swirl"), who reacted by joining with friends who were organizing her school's anti-187 movement and by affirming the identity of her maternal ancestry: "When we get together to talk about it, we speak Spanish and just feel good about being Mexican." Proposition 187 won in a landslide, getting 59% of the statewide vote, and 67% in San Diego and Orange Counties. But Stephanie's Mexican ethnic self-identity was "thickened" in the process, as she came to define who she was and where she came from in opposition to who and what she was not. The divisive campaign had the unintended consequences of accentuating group differences, heightening group consciousness of those differences, hardening ethnic identity boundaries between "us" and "them," and promoting ethnic group solidarity and political mobilization.
This process of forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, discrimination and exclusion is not uncommon. It is one mode of ethnic identity formation, highlighting the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity (Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Rumbaut 2005) . A few years earlier, second-generation KoreanAmericans saw over 2,300 Korean-owned stores in Los Angeles' Koreatown targeted by African Americans and burned during the rioting that followed a "not guilty" verdict in the 1992 trial of four white police officers charged with the brutal beating of a black motorist.
The event caused many young Koreans born or raised in the U.S. to become self-conscious about their common fate and distinctiveness as Koreans. They reacted by participating in multigenerational solidarity rallies and by moving to organize politically to protect the interests of the parent generation and the image of the group in the larger society. In this special issue, several of the essays focus precisely on the dialectics of reactive ethnicity and civic engagement-from Arab Americans in the 1990s (well before 9/11) to wellacculturated second-generation Cuban Americans during the months-long crisis over a 6-year old boy named Elián González (see Santiago and Dorchner, 2000) .
In contrast, conventional accounts of ethnic identity shifts among the descendants of white European immigrants, conceived as part of a larger, linear process of assimilation, have pointed to the "thinning" of their ethnic self-identities in the U.S. For their descendants, at least, one outcome of widespread acculturation, social mobility and intermarriage with the native population was that ethnic identity became an optional form of "symbolic ethnicity" (Alba 1990; Gans 1979; Waters 1990 ). This mode of ethnic identity formation, however, was never solely a function of social status and degree of acculturation to the majority group, but hinged also on the context of reception and the degree of discrimination experienced by the subordinate group: i.e., it was facilitated by an absence of prejudice and discrimination in the core society. Whether ethnicity will become similarly optional for the offspring of immigrants who are today variously classified as non-white, or whether they will be collectively channeled into enduring, engulfing, racially marked subordinate statuses and forge oppositional identities and reactive political mobilizations, remain open empirical questions.
As the papers in this issue demonstrate, youths see and compare themselves in relation to those around them, based on their social similarity or dissimilarity with the reference groups that most directly affect their experiences-especially with regard to such socially visible and categorized markers as gender, phenotype, accent, language, name and nationality. Their social identities, forged in terms of those contrasts with others, represent the way they self-consciously define the situation in which they find themselves and construct an ongoing account of who "we"-and "they"-are. Ethnic identification begins with the application of a label to oneself in a cognitive process of self-categorization, involving not only a claim to membership in a group or category, but also a contrast of one's group or category with other groups or categories. Such self-definitions also carry affective meaning, implying a psychological bond with others that tends to serve psychologically protective functions. Ethnic self-awareness is heightened or blurred, respectively, depending on the degree of dissonance or consonance of the social contexts which are basic to identity formation.
For majority-group youths in an ethnically consonant context, ethnic self-identity tends to be taken for granted and is not salient; but contextual dissonance (let alone a "war on terror") heightens the salience of ethnicity and of ethnic group boundaries. People whose ethnic, racial or other social markers place them in a minority status in their group or community are more likely to be self-conscious of those characteristics. Youths may cope with the psychological pressure produced by such dissonance (and with pejorative group stereotypes) by seeking to reduce conflict and to assimilate within the relevant social context-the modal response of the children of European immigrants in the American experience. An alternative reaction may lead in an opposite direction to the rise and reaffirmation of ethnic solidarity and self-consciousness, as exemplified by Stephanie Bernal in the vignette sketched earlier. For Stephanie, the newfound sense of belonging she experienced in joining the movement against Proposition 187 helped dissolve the marginality and ambiguity of a "mixed chocolate swirl" identity.
A longitudinal study of more than 5,200 teenage children of immigrants from 77 nationalities in Southern California and South Florida in the 1990s (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) found that despite their growing awareness of racial and ethnic inequalities, almost two-thirds of the youth affirmed a confident belief in the promise of equal opportunity through educational achievement; 61% further agreed in the baseline survey that "there is no better country to live in than the United States," and that endorsement grew to 71% three years later-despite a growing anti-immigrant mood in the country and especially in California during that period. Tellingly, the groups most likely to endorse that view were the children of political exiles who found a favorable context of reception in the U.S.: the Cubans (before Elián) and the Vietnamese. The groups least likely to agree with that statement were those who had most felt the weight of racial discrimination: the children of immigrants from Haiti, Jamaica and the West Indies. In reacting to their contexts of reception and learning how they are viewed and treated within them, the youths form and inform their own attitudes toward the society that receives them-and their own identities as well. If there is a moral to this story of reception and belonging, it echoes an ancient admonition: that societies, too, reap what they sow.
